مقاله ای راجع به اثرات اقتصادی نوع نظام مردم سالار
Hinnerich, B. T., & Pettersson‐Lidbom, P. (2014). Democracy, Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919–1938. Econometrica,82(3), 961-993.
بخش انتهایی (نتیجه گیری) مقاله
We compare how two political regimes—direct versus representative democracy— redistribute income toward the poor segments of society after the introduction of universal suffrage in Swedish local governments. For this purpose, we exploit a population threshold, which partly determined a local government’s choice of democracy. Our regression-discontinuity design generates credible causal estimates under very weak identification assumptions. The results indicate that direct democracies spend 40–60 percent less on public welfare than representative democracies. We also find that citizens are much better organized collectively in representative democracies after democratization, and that unemployed workers tend to get more welfare support in those democracies than the permanently poor. These results are consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006, 2008) framework of democratization, which stressed how political regimes shape the ability of different groups in society to solve collective-action problems.